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NOTES
pledge promptly when the debt is paid or secure other reliable
evidence of its payment in order to avoid any confusion at a later
date.
The main risk for creditors after Kaplan is that they may find
themselves holding an enforceable principal obligation but no secur-
ity. Creditors -should insert a stipulation in the pledge agreement
that the failure of the debtor to reacknowledge the pledged prom-
issory note within the prescriptive period is a condition of default.
The problems Kaplan poses to the security function of pledge
may be minimized by such precautions; however, a sound approach
to the constant acknowledgment problems would be to decide the
issue of prescription on a case-by-case basis." If a court finds that a
pledge no longer has value, either because the pledge is prescribed
or because it no longer exists, the constant acknowledgment rule
should cease to apply. This approach would insure that the pledge
remains a valuable security device, rather than a tool to interrupt
prescription permanently.
Maureen Anne Noonan
DISCHARGE OF FEDERAL TAX LIENS IN EXECUTORY PROCEEDINGS
The plaintiff bought certain immovable property from a bank
that had, through executory process, sued upon its mortgage and ac-
quired the land at the subsequent sheriff's sale. Inferior federal in-
come tax liens affecting the property were cancelled from the mort-
gage records by the parish clerk of court when the proceeds of the
judicial sale to the bank did not cover the interests of the superior
creditors. The Internal Revenue Service subsequently levied upon
the property, claiming that, since the United States had not received
proper notice of the judicial sale, the liens were still valid; the plain-
tiff sued, alleging that the federal tax liens had been discharged by
the sheriff's sale of the property. The district court held: section
7425(b) of the Internal Revenue Code relating to "other sales," which
requires written notice to the I.R.S., applies to Louisiana's ex-
ecutory process; because proper notice was not given, the judicial
sale did not discharge the federal tax liens. Myers v. United States,
483 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. La. 1980).'
60. This approach was suggested in 1978-1979 Term, supra note 52, at 578.
1. The scope of this note is limited to the issue of whether or not the tax liens
were discharged by the judicial sale.
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A federal tax lien is created when a person liable to pay a tax
fails to do so after demand.2 The lien applies to all property of the
tax debtor, whether real or personal.' Although state law defines
property and rights to property, federal law determines the federal
tax consequences flowing from the state property status.' A tax lien
arises at the time assessment is made, 5 exists until the liability is
satisfied or until it becomes unenforceable by the lapse of time,' and
may pass with the property into the hands of a third person.7
Because the lien is created by federal statute, the existence, extent,
duration, priority, and discharge of the lien are matters of federal
law, and state law is relevant only to the extent that federal law
adopts state provisions.'
State requirements for the registration of immovable property
transactions' were incorporated into the federal revenue laws as
early as 1913,0 partly to alleviate the harsh effect of cases holding
that "secret liens" on property (i.e., liens of which the public lacks
actual or constructive notice) were effective against subsequent
bona fide purchasers." The 1913 law, as codified, protects certain
classes of persons from tax liens not filed properly for registry.2
Even if properly filed, federal tax liens may be subordinate to other
security interests; since the development of the "first in time, first
2. I.R.C. § 6321.
3. Id.
4. United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129, 133 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 109 n.20 (3d Cir. 1964).
5. United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, 88 (1963).
6. I.R.C. § 6322.
7. United States v. Cohen, 271 F. Supp. 709, 717 (S.D. Fla. 1967). See Michigan v.
United States, 317 U.S. 338, 340 (1943). See generally 84 C.J.S. Taxation 593(b) (1954).
8. See Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338, 340 (1943); United States v. Sec-
ond Nat'l Bank of N. Miami, 502 F.2d 535, 545 (5th Cir. 1974); S. D'Antoni, Inc. v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 496 F.2d 1378, 1384 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bluhm,
414 F.2d 1240, 1243 (7th Cir. 1969). Cf. In Re Cal-neva Lodge, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 187 (D.
Nev. 1960) (state statutes cannot frustrate federal tax collection). See generally W.
PLUMB, JR. & L. WRIGHT, FEDERAL TAX LIENS 46-48 (2d ed. 1967); 35 Am. Jur. 2d
Federal Tax Enforcement §§ 2 & 6 (1967).
9. I.R.C. § 6323(f). See LA. R.S. 52:51-55 (1950); S. D'Antoni, Inc. v. Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 496 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1974).
10. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016.
11! United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893); United States v. Hodes, 355 F.2d
746, 749 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir. 1960). See
United States v. Lebanon Woolen Mills Corp., 241 F. Supp. 393, 396 n.1 (D.N.H. 1964).
12. United States v. Tex. Eastern Transmission Corp., 254 F. Supp. 114, 117 (W.D.
La. 1965). Although the federal statute requires indexing in addition to filing in certain
cases, in all others the failure of state officials to properly record and index the notice
of a tax lien does not affect the validity of the lien against third persons. Adams v.
United States, 420 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); I.R.C. § 6323(f)(4).
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in right" rule by the courts,13 the ranking or priority of federal tax
liens with the security interests of third persons is determined by
the order of filing. Hence, perfected state-created security interests
may relegate the Government to the status of a junior lienor."
Even if the federal tax lien notices are filed properly before
competing security interests are perfected, the lien may be dis-
charged by the Government. The I.R.S. has several procedures by
which it can enforce and collect overdue taxes secured by a lien;"
the I.R.S. also has authority, under certain circumstances, to dis-
charge the lien from property where the interest of the United
States is valueless." Whether these federal procedures for the
discharge of tax liens are exclusive of state discharge procedures is
not specified in the federal statutes.
By a narrow majority the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Brosnan7 ruled that federal procedures for the
release or discharge of tax liens did not preempt state provisions
governing mortgage foreclosures, 8 which discharged inferior liens,
although junior lienors were neither made a party to the pro-
ceedings 9 nor received actual notice of them." The dissenters to
Brosnan expressed concern over the potentially adverse impact of
the majority opinion upon the federal government fisc.21 Declining to
apply the doctrine of sovereign immunity,"2 however, the Court
stated that it was filling a hiatus in the federal statutory scheme
and that the result was to be followed "until Congress otherwise
determines . . .,.
Reacting to the obvious hint in Brosnan, Congress passed the
1966 Federal Tax Lien Act.25 One provision of the Act, codified as
I.R.C. § 7425, expressly regulates the discharge of federal tax liens.
13. See United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963); S. D'Antoni, Inc.
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 496 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1974).
14. See United States v. Bluhm, 414 F.2d 1240, 1243 (7th Cir. 1969).
15. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6331 (levy and distraint); I.R.C. § 6335 (sale of seized prop-
erty); I.R.C. § 7425(d) (redemption by the United States of property, liens on which
were discharged by sale).
16. I.R.C. § 6325(b)(2)(B).
17. 363 U.S. 237 (1960).
18. Id. at 252.
19. Id. at 250.
20. Id. at 239.
21. Id. at 261.
22. Id. at 250-51.
23. Id. at 252. See also United States v. Boyd, 246 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1957).
24. See G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 221A, at 436 (2d ed.
1970); W. PLUMB & L. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 232.
25. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966).
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The statute distinguishes between "judicial proceedings,"" which re-
quire joinder of the United States as a party, and "other sales," 7 in
which the district director of the I.R.S. must be given written notice
26. I.R.C. § 7425(a). The text provides:
If the United States is not joined as a party, a judgment in any civil action or
suit described in subsection (a) of section 2410 of title 28 of the United States
Code, or a judicial sale pursuant to such a judgment, with respect to property on
which the United States has or claims a lien under the provisions of this title-
(1) shall be made subject to and without disturbing the lien of the United
States, if notice of such lien has been filed in the place provided by law for
such filing at the time such action or suit is commenced, or
(2) shall have the same effect with respect to the discharge or divestment
of such lien of the United States as may be provided with respect to such
matters by the local law of the place where such property is situated, if no
notice of such lien has been filed in the place provided by law for such filing
at the time such action or suit is commenced or if the law makes no provision
for such filing.
If a judicial sale of property pursuant to a judgment in any civil action or suit to
which the United States is not a party discharges a lien of the United States aris-
ing under the provisions of this title, the United States may claim, with the same
priority as its lien had against the property sold, the proceeds (exclusive of costs)
of such sale at any time before the distribution of such proceeds is ordered.
27. I.R.C. § 7425. The text provides, in part:
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) a sale of property on which the United
States has or claims a lien, or a title derived from enforcement of a lien, under
the provisions of this title, made pursuant to an instrument creating a lien on
such property, pursuant to a confession of judgment on the obligation secured by
such an instrument, or pursuant to a nonjudicial sale under a statutory lien on
such property-
(1) shall, except as otherwise provided, be made subject to and without
disturbing such lien or title, if notice of such lien was filed or such title
recorded in the place provided by law for such filing or recording more than
30 days before such sale and the United States is not given notice of such
sale in the manner prescribed in subsection (c) (1); or
(2) shall have the same effect with respect to the discharge of divestment
of such lien or such title of the United States, as may be provided with
respect to such matters by the local law of the place where such property is
situated, if-
(A) notice of such lien or such title was not filed or recorded in the
place provided by law for such filing more than 30 days before such sale,
(B) the law makes no provision for such filing, or
(C) notice of such sale is given in the manner prescribed in subsec-
tion (c)(1).
(c)(1) Notice of sale.-Notice of a sale to which subsection (b) applies shall be
given (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary) in writing, by
registered or certified mail or by personal service, not less than 25 days prior to
such sale, to the Secretary.
(2) Consent to sale.-Notwithstanding the notice requirement of subsec-
tion (b)(2)(C), a sale described in subsection (b) of property shall discharge or
divest such property of the lien or title of the United States if the United
States consents to the sale of such property free of such lien or title.
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at least twenty-five days prior to the date of sale. 8 Failure of the
foreclosing creditor to join the Government in a "judicial pro-
ceeding" or to give the prescribed notice of an "other sale" results
in the lien's remaining undisturbed; it remains attached to and will
follow the property into the hands of a third party.29
Notice of the federal tax lien in the instant case was filed after
28. Treas. Reg. § 301.7425-3(a) & (d) (Aug. 20, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 35180. The text
of the regulations provides in part:
Except in the case of the sale of perishable goods described in paragraph (c) of
this section, a notice (as described in paragraph (d) of this section) of a non-judicial
sale shall be given, in writing by registered or certified mail or by personal ser-
vice, not less than 25 days prior to the date of sale (determined under the provi-
sions of paragraph (b) of § 301.7425-2), to the district director (marked for the at-
tention of the chief, special procedures staff) for the internal revenue district in
which the sale is to be conducted. Thus, under this section, a notice of sale is not
effective if it is given to a district director other than the district director for the
internal revenue district in which the sale is to be conducted. The provisions of
section 7502 (relating to timely mailing treated as timely filing) and 7503 (relating
to time for performance of acts where the last day falls on Saturday, Sunday, or
legal holiday) apply in the case of notices required to be made under this para-
graph.
With respect to a notice of sale described in paragraph (a) or (c) of this section,
the notice will be considered adequate if it contains the information described in
paragraph (d)(1)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) of this section.
(i) The name and address of the person submitting the notice of sale;
(ii) A copy of each Notice of Federal Tax Lien (Form 668) affecting the
property to be sold, or the following information as shown on each such
Notice of Federal Tax Lien-
(A) The internal revenue district named thereon,
(B) The name and address of the taxpayer, and
(C) The date and place of filing of the notice;
(iii) With respect to the property to be sold, the following information-
(A) A detailed description, including location, of the property af-
fected by the notice (in the case of real property, the street address,
city, and State and the legal description contained in the title or deed to
the property and, if available, a copy of the abstract of title),
(B) The date, time, place, and terms of the proposed sale of the prop-
erty, and
(C) In the case of a sale of perishable property described in par-
agraph (c) of this section, a statement of the reasons why the property
is believed to be perishable; and
(iv) The approximate amount of the principal obligation, including in-
terest, secured by the lien sought to be enforced and a description of the
other expenses (such as legal expenses, selling costs, etc.) which may be
charged against the proceeds.
29. I.R.C. § 7425(b)(1). See Baum v. United States, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975),
aff'g 74-1 U.S. Tax Cases (C.C.H.) 9415; National Cent. Bank v. United States, 40
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 77-5471, 5473 (M.D. Pa. June 8, 1977); Puls v. United States, 387 F.
Supp. 760 (N.D. Ca. 1974). Cf. A.H. and R.S. Coal Corp. v. United States, 461 F. Supp.
752, 756-57 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (dictum).
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the suit was commenced but more than thirty days before the ju-
dicial sale." If the executory proceeding were classified by the
Myers court as a "judicial proceeding," the federal lien would have
been discharged. On the other hand, if the court classified the action
as an "other sale," the judicial sale would not have discharged the
tax lien. The determinative issue before the Myers court was the
proper classification, within the framework of the 1966 Federal Tax
Lien Act, of an action on a mortgage utilizing Louisiana's executory
process.3
Relying primarily upon an excerpt from the Senate Report on
the Act," the court construed "judicial proceedings" to mean
plenary judicial proceedings.3 Concluding that Louisiana's executory
process was "clearly not a plenary judicial proceeding,"3 the district
court discussed the nature of executory process, describing it as an
expedited in rem action based upon the debtor's confession of judg-
ment in the security instrument. 5 The court placed the foreclosure
proceedings within the category covered by section 7425(b) dealing
with "other sales," and found that the notice of a tax lien was filed
properly by the Government and that the required prior notice to
the I.R.S. had not been given; the court concluded that the tax liens
were not discharged by the judicial sale.3
The court's basic methodology is sound, although the brief anal-
ysis does not provide a sufficiently illuminative exposition of the
30. 483 F. Supp. at 1159-60. An earlier tax lien notice was filed properly before
commencement of the foreclosure proceedings and more than 30 days before the
judicial sale. Since the United States was not joined as a party to the action, and since
the I.R.S. was not given proper notice at least 25 days prior to the judicial sale, the
sale did not discharge the first tax lien.
31. Id. at 1158.
32. Id. at 1158-59; S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19631 3 U.S.
CODE, CONG. & AD. NEws 3722, 3748-49.
33. 483 F. Supp. at 1159.
34. Id. (emphasis in original).
35. Id. In concluding that executory procedure is not plenary, the Myers decision
notes that clerks of court constitutionally may issue the decree. State constitutional
and statutory provisions, however, give clerks of court quasi-judicial authority as
neutral officers of the state. Clerks of court, like judges, have the discretionary author-
ity and the duty to deny a legally defective request for executory process. In no case
does a writ issue by mere praecipe of the seizing creditor. The title of the state official
does not control the issue; rather, the inquiry centers on the relationship between the
official's role in executory process and the goal of protecting the interest of the
Government. Thus the fact that clerks of court may issue the decree is no barrier to
the conclusion that an action by executory process may be a "judicial proceeding"
within the terms of § 7425(a), at which the United States may appear to protect its in-
terests. See LA. CONST. art. V, 28(A); LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 283(2); Hood Motor Co., Inc.
v. Lawrence, 320 So. 2d 117 (La. 1975).
36. 483 F. Supp. at 1159-60.
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issue. Proper analysis depends upon examining the federal statute,
the nature of Louisiana's executory process, and their relationship.
Although it is relevant,37 the legislative history of the 1966 Federal
Tax Lien Act is not conclusive as to the question of the legislative
intent;38 "reliance on legislative history in divining the intent of Con-
gress is, as has often been observed, a step to be taken cautiously."39
The regulations an executive agency with expertise in a particular
area issues pursuant to the statute often are given significant inter-
pretive weight,9 if they comport with the clear meaning of the stat-
ute. 1 The applicable agency regulations construe I.R.C. § 7425(a) as
pertaining to "judicial proceedings . . . plenary in nature and [which]
proceed on formal pleadings." 2
Neither the statute, the regulations, nor the court's opinion
defines "plenary judicial proceedings." The definitions of the terms
"plenary" and "judicial proceedings" suggest that "plenary judicial
proceedings" are a complete and formal hearing or trial on the mer-
its, in which the parties have the opportunity to be heard, and
wherein the tribunal proceeds to a determination of law upon proved
or conceded facts.43 The proceedings are to be distinguished from a
less strict and more informal summary hearing. Furthermore, I.R.C.
§ 7425(a) describes the consequences of a failure to join as a party
the United States "in any civil action or suit described in [28 U.S.C.
2410(a)]." Such an action or suit includes one "to foreclose a mort-
gage or other lien upon . . .real or personal property on which the
United States has or claims a mortgage or other lien." Section 2410
establishes the conditions, tailored to protect governmental in-
terests, under which the United States may be joined in such an ac-
tion or suit; these conditions provide further guidance as to the
meaning of the term "plenary judicial proceeding." The most signifi-
cant of them are that (1) the United States may be joined as a party;
(2) the action is initiated by a complaint or other pleading; (3) pro-
37. S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE, CONG. &
AD NEWS 3722, 3748: "Where there is a plenary judicial proceeding .... The bill pro-
vides that in a plenary judicial proceeding .... "
38. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 468 (1975).
39. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
40. See Goldman v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., 497 F.2d 382, 383 (6th Cir.
1974); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 656 (5th Cir. 1968).
41. Cf. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979)
(deference to agency interpretation constrained by the obligation to honor the clear
meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, purpose, and history).
42. Treas. Reg. § 301.7425-1(a) (Aug. 20, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 35178 (1976). The text
provides that the "judicial proceedings are plenary in nature and proceed on formal
pleadings."
43. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 762, 1038-39 (5th ed. 1979).
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cess is served upon the United States; (4) the Government may ap-
pear, answer, plead, or demur; (5) the suit results in a judgment or
decree; (6) the United States may intervene if not named as a party,
"as if the United States had originally been named a defendant in
such action or suit";" and (7) the action must seek judicial sale. 5
By negative implication I.R.C. § 7425(b), which deals with "other
sales," provides additional evidence of the meaning of "judicial pro-
ceedings." The statute provides that, with respect to a sale pursuant
to an instrument creating a lien on the property or to a confession
of judgment on the obligation secured by an instrument creating a
lien on the property, prior notice of the sale must be given to the
I.R.S. The first sale listed is one made pursuant to a power of sale, a
clause commonly found in mortgages giving the mortgagee the
power to auction the property at public sale, to convey title to the
purchaser, and to satisfy the debt out of the sale proceeds upon the
breach by the mortgagor, without court participation." The confes-
sion of judgment is a common-law mortgage foreclosure device au-
thorizing the creditor to enter judgment against the debtor on a
conclusory basis. 7 The characteristics common to these proceedings
are the absence of meaningful judicial participation, the lack of op-
portunity for other creditors to be represented as parties, and the
inability of opposing parties to assert effectively their interests.
Congress recognized that under Brosnan the interests of the United
States could not be protected adequately without an opportunity for
the Government to be represented at these types of foreclosure
sales and therefore treated them differently from "judicial pro-
ceedings." The required actual notice performs the same function in
"other sales" as does joinder under section 7425(a) and 28 U.S.C. §
2410; notice allows the United States to appear and to take action to
preserve its security interest. Thus, Congress probably intended
"judicial proceedings" to mean those in which the Government could
assert its interests before a neutral state judicial officer in hopes of
altering the outcome of the foreclosure proceedings. If so,
Louisiana's executory process may be a "judicial proceeding" for
that purpose.
Executory process in Louisiana is an in rem action derived from
44. I.R.C. § 7424.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (1976).
46. See generally National Life Ins. Co. v. Silverman, 454 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Maynard v. Sutherland, 313 F.2d 560 (D.C. Cir. 1962); R. KRATOVIL. MODERN
MORTGAGE LAW & PRACTICE §§ 502-22 (1972); G. OSBORNE, supra note 24, §§ 337-45.
47. United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 250 (1960) (Pennsylvania foreclosure
proceedings based on debtor's confession of judgment in the mortgage instrument).
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continental civil law systems and is unknown to the common law. 8 It
is a procedure "to effect the seizure and sale of property, without
previous citation and judgment, to enforce a mortgage or privilege
thereon evidenced by an authentic act importing a confession of
judgment."" The confession of judgment merely authorizes an action
in rem;0 the gravamen of the process is that, since the confession
of judgment was made before a notary public and witnesses, the
confession of judgment is entitled to at least prima facie judicial
recognition. Essentially, executory process commences where an or-
dinary proceeding ends.
Upon presentation by the seizing creditor of the necessary
authentic proof," the existence of which is emphasized heavily in the
jurisprudence,"2 an order directing the issuance of a writ of seizure
and sale issues and is carried out in a manner similar to a writ of
fieri facias; 3 a judicial sale follows the sheriff's seizure of the prop-
erty.' The debtor may defend his interests by taking a suspensive
48. See Ross v. Brown Title Corp., 356 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. La. 1973), affd, 412 U.S.
934 (1973); Hood Motor Co., Inc. v. Lawrence, 320 So. 2d 111, 112-13 (La. 1975); Reed v.
Meaux, 292 So. 2d 557, 559 (La. 1974); Buckner v. Carmack, 272 So. 2d 326, 329 (La.
1973); Louisiana Bank & Trust Co. v. Pernici, 372 So. 2d 788, 791-92 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1979); Cameron-Brown South, Inc. v. East Glen Oaks, Inc., 341 So. 2d 450, 457 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1976); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Dixon, 142 So. 2d 605, 607 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962). See also Fleitas v. Richardson, 147 U.S. 538, 544 (1893) (dictum that executory
process is analgous to certain common law procedures). For a thorough analysis of
Louisiana's executory process and its history, see McMahon, The Historical Develop-
ment of Executory Procedure in Louisiana, 32 TUL. L. REV. 555 (1958).
49. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2631.
50. Nathan, The "In Rem" Mortgage, 44 TUL. L. REV. 497 (1970).
51. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 2635-37. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 22.4.
52. See American Bank & Trust Co. in Monroe v. Carson Homes, Inc., 316 So. 2d
732, 734 (La. 1975) ("If the essential authentic evidence is lacking, executory process is
unavailable, and the creditor's remedy is by ordinary process"); Miller, Lyon & Co. v.
Cappel, 36 La. Ann. 264 (1884) ("To justify the order of seizure and sale every muni-
ment of title, and every link of evidence must be in the authentic form. In such a pro-
ceeding the judge can entertain no matter in pais"); American Sec. Bank of Ville Platte
v. Deville, 368 So. 2d 167, 169 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979) (at the corpus of executory pro-
cess is the requirement of authentic evidence); Ford Motor Co. v. Herron, 234 So. 2d
517, 519 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); American Budget Plan, Inc. v. Small, 229 So. 2d 190,
192 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
53. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 2638, 2721-24.
54. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2616-25. See Wetherbee v. Lodwick Lumber Co., 194 La.
352, 372, 193 So. 671, 677 (1940); New Orleans Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruddock, 22 La. Ann.
46, 47 (1870). See also Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. City of Clarksdale, 257 U.S. 10,
19 (1921); Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 495, 547 (1850); United States v. Branch
Coal Corp., 390 F.2d 7, 9 (3d Cir. 1968); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Land Estates,
90 F.2d 457, 458 (2d Cir. 1937); In Re Haywood Wagon Co., 219 F. 655, 659 (2d Cir.
1914); Laurel Oil & Gas Co. v. Galbreath Oil & Gas Co., 165 F. 162, 165 (8th Cir. 1908);
Chew v. Hyman, 7 F. 7, 14 (1881).
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appeal from the order directing issuance of the writ of seizure and
sale55 or by obtaining an interlocutory injunction arresting the
seizure and sale.
Viewed in isolation, executory process would not appear to meet
the conditions of a "plenary judicial proceeding." When viewed as a
part of the totality of Louisiana's procedural system, however, ex-
ecutory process should be classified as plenary because non-seizing
creditors may participate in the proceedings in order to determine
the validity, rank, and amounts of competing claims against the
property, and the distribution of the proceeds of the judicial sale.
These creditors may assert their interests voluntarily by interven-
ing57 or may be ruled into court via summary process by the seizing
creditor. 8 Intervention may take place at any time before distribu-
tion of the proceeds of the judicial sale." By intervening, the United
States does "not thereby admit judicially the validity, nor is . . .[it]
estopped from asserting the invalidity, of the claim of the seizing
creditor.""0 But since intervention may not be compelled,61 the
United States may refrain from intervening and assert the con-
tinued validity of the tax lien after the judicial sale. Although one
court has stated in dictum that when the Government has the oppor-
tunity to intervene in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding and does
not do so, the Government is estopped from asserting the validity of
its lien, 2 this rationale provides little assurance to title examiners,
to seizing creditors, or to subsequent purchasers of the property en-
cumbered with the tax lien.
A seizing creditor may, by a rule to show cause at the time he
petitions for executory process, ensure the Government's participa-
55. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2642.
56. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 2642 & 2751-54.
57. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1092, 1093, 2592 & 2643.
58. Merrick v. McCausland, 24 La. Ann. 256 (1872); Munson v. Risinger, 114 So. 2d
56, 58-59 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959). See also Courshon v. Mauroner-Craddock, Inc., 219
So. 2d 254, 257 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Hibernia Homestead & Say. Ass'n v. Fletcher,
181 So. 2d 815 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
59. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1092.
60. Id.
61. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1092, 2643 & 5053. Cf. Hibernia Homestead & Savings
Ass'n v. Fletcher, 181 So. 2d 815, 816 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966) (dictum).
62. Galesi v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 623 (D. Vt. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 544
F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding when the United States filed a tax lien notice after the
commencement of a strict foreclosure mortgage proceeding to which I.R.C. § 7425(a)
applied, and the United States was not joined as a party thereto, the judgment order
of foreclosure discharged the tax lien.). Cf. Runkel v. United States, 527 F.2d 914 (9th
Cir. 1975). But cf. Dime Sav. Bank of Brooklyn v. Sherman, 314 N.Y.S.2d 86, 64 Misc.
2d 457 (1970).
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tion in the proceedings. The articles on summary process expressly
provide that the "determination of the rank of mortgages, liens, and
privileges on property sold judicially, and of the order of distribu-
tion of the proceeds thereof," properly may be raised by a rule to
show cause." Therefore, the seizing creditor may summon into court
other creditors, including the United States, to show cause why
their interests should not be ranked as inferior to his. Service of a
copy of the rule and a hearing on the rule affords other creditors, in-
cluding the United States, ample opportunity to protect their in-
terests.
All of the characteristics of the type of action contemplated by
28 U.S.C. § 2410 are inherent in this expanded analysis of executory
process, for (1) the United States becomes a party defendant in rule;
(2) the action is initiated by the petition of the seizing creditor to let
executory process issue and to have a copy of the rule served on the
defendants in rule; (3) copies of the rule and the order assigning the
date and hour of the trial on the rule are served upon the des-
ignated representatives of the United States; (4) the Government
may answer the rule, assert the validity, priority, and amount of its
lien, and also contest the claims of the seizing creditor and other
claimants; (5) the action results in a court decree fixing the validity,
priority, and amount of the claims and in an order directing issuance
of the writ of seizure and sale; (6) the United States may intervene;
and (7) the action seeks a judicial sale of the seized property. Since
executory process, in conjunction with the interrelated procedural
articles on intervention and summary process, can be viewed as a
plenary judicial proceeding, I.R.C. § 7425(a) should have controlled
the issue before the Myers court. By the terms of that statute, since
the tax lien was not filed at the commencement of the proceedings,
the lien should have been discharged by the judicial sale.
An appropriate amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure ar-
ticles on summary process, expressly providing for the joinder of
the United States in executory proceedings where the Government
has or claims a tax lien, is desirable to dispel the uncertainty
created by the clash of federal and state law in the instant case. Ab-
sent such an amendment or persuasive appellate opinion, seizing
creditors should satisfy the requirements of both "judicial pro-
ceedings" and "other sales." This precaution is necessary, for if ex-
ecutory process is classified as a "judicial proceeding," the written
notice required for "other sales" is not sufficient to discharge the
tax lien; conversely, if executory process is classified as an "other
63. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2592(7).
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sale," joinder of the United States is likewise insufficient to
discharge the lien. The rule should satisfy the informational re-
quirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2410(b), 4 and both a copy of the rule and
written notice satisfying the "other sales" provisions should be served
upon the appropriate representatives of the United States and upon
the district director of the I.R.S. of the district in which the prop-
erty is located, at least twenty-five days before the judicial sale.
When time permits and when the interest of the United States is
without value, the seizing creditor may obtain and file a "Condi-
tional Commitment to Discharge Certain Property From Federal
Tax Lien"; with certain limitations the commitment is conclusive
evidence that the federal tax lien has been discharged from the
property. 5
Pannal Alan Sanders
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(b) (1976) provides:
The complaint or pleading shall set forth with particularity the nature of the
interest or lien of the United States. In actions or suits involving liens arising
under the internal revenue laws, the complaint or pleading shall include the name
and address of the taxpayer whose liability created the lien and, if a notice of the
tax lien was filed, the identity of the internal revenue office which filed the
notice, and the date and place such notice of lien was filed. In actions in the State
courts service upon the United States shall be made by serving the process of the
court with a copy of the complaint upon the United States attorney for the
district in which the action is brought or upon an assistant United States attorney
or clerical employee designated by the United States attorney in writing filed
with the clerk of the court in which the action is brought and by sending copies of
the process and complaint, by registered mail, or by certified mail, to the At-
torney General of the United States at Washington, District of Columbia. In such
actions the United States may appear and answer, plead or demur within sixty
days after such service or such further time as the court may allow.
65. W. PLUMB & L. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 41, 43. See I.R.C. § 6325.
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